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Mind the gap- national and local partnership in the 
Irish public sector 




This article uses case study data from a major Irish city council to investigate 
and explain public sector worker attitudes towards social partnership at local 
and national level. It is argued that the more sceptical attitudes to workplace 
partnership reflect structural differences between local and national 
arrangements, which have enabled public sector employers to use  ‘social 
partnership’ as a constraint in the implementation process of a pre-determined 
public sector reform agenda.   
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The period since 1987 has seen the conclusion of a succession of national 
social pacts between the Irish social partners. Since the mid-1990s the 
diffusion of partnership to workplace level has become an important objective 
of the agreements. While much has been written on the macro-effects of 
national partnership (Hastings et al., 2007; McSharry and White, 2001), 
empirical studies of the actual effects of existing workplace partnership 
structures have been slower to emerge (cf, D’Art and Turner, 2002; Geary, 
2008; Geary and Roche, 2006). Even rarer are accounts of the partnership 
process that explicitly incorporate both national and workplace levels. This 
may be understandable in the private sector context, where national deals 
place few obligations on employers beyond pay, but, as we will see, seems 
less explicable in relation to the public sector. In addition, the literature has 
primarily been concerned with the impact of partnership processes on the 
industrial relations (IR) actors, rather than on employees themselves.  
 
This article uses case study data to investigate and explain differing public 
sector worker attitudes towards social partnership at local and national levels. 
The role of the public sector is crucial to any analysis of Irish social 
partnership. First, given that trade union density in the public sector is much 
higher than in the private sector, the public sector unions (in particular the 
state’s second-largest union, the Irish Municipal Public and Civil Trade Union-
IMPACT) have always had a key role in shaping and sustaining the process 
(Baccaro and Simoni, 2007). At workplace level, it is important to note that, 
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although the development of workplace partnership structures has been 
promoted in the national deals since the mid-1990s, initiatives have been 
voluntarist in nature, and the result has been a low incidence of workplace 
partnership structures in the private sector; these are much more common in 
the public sector (O’ Connell et al., 2004; Geary, 2006). 1 Finally, a key focus 
of our analysis is the interlinking of the partnership and public sector 
modernisation agendas, which, we will argue, is vital to explaining worker 
attitudes to public sector partnership.  
 
Our data suggests that, while national agreements are perceived quite 
positively, public sector workers’ attitudes towards local partnership 
arrangements are much more sceptical. Likewise, local partnership 
arrangements seem to be much more unstable than national pacts (O’Connell 
et al., 2004). It has been suggested that the difficulties of local partnership are 
linked to the more militant attitudes of workers, middle-management and 
worker representatives. Our analysis of partnership structures and 
examination of worker attitudes, however, proffers a different explanation 
focusing on how workplace partnership in the public sector has been used as 
a means of facilitating the implementation of a pre-determined management 
reform agenda.  
 
                                               
1
 Note, too, recent evidence that the overwhelming majority of workplace partnership 
agreements in the UK, albeit in a very different institutional setting, are in the public sector 
(Bacon and Samuel, 2009). 
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Can’t We All Just Get Along? Partnership and Public 
Sector Reform 
The Irish social partnership process has attracted significant attention in the 
IR literature, with a significant portion of this focused on ‘accounting’ for the 
Irish case (Auer, 2000; Baccaro, 2003; Roche, 2007), as Ireland, with its 
Anglo-Saxon IR tradition, was seen as not possessing the classical 
‘institutional preconditions’ (Baccaro, 2002) for corporatist deals. Thus, the 
Irish process has been variously categorised as an example of: ‘deliberative 
governance’ (O’ Donnell, 2000); ‘competitive corporatism’ (Roche, 2007); an 
‘unorthodox system of institutional complementarities’ (Teague and 
Donaghey, 2009); and, from a critical perspective, union incorporation (Allen, 
2000) and the emasculation of Parliamentary democracy (O’ Cinnéide, 1998). 
The intention here is not necessarily to weigh in on this debate, but to flag a 
possible alternative way of viewing the partnership process as it applies to the 
public sector, focusing on the (to date somewhat neglected) relationship 
between partnership and public sector reform. 
 
For both critics and proponents of the partnership process, with its high-level 
political exchange between union elites, employers and government, and the 
tendency under bargained corporatism for power to shift towards the union 
centre, a fundamental concern relates to the exclusion of participation by 
workers and union members at the level of the workplace. Ireland (unlike 
many European countries) does not provide for workplace participation in the 
form of statutory works councils.  As the national process developed, 
therefore, attempts intensified to develop partnership at workplace level and 
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thus link up the enhanced role for trade unions at national level with increased 
influence for workplace worker representatives. The Partnership 2000 and 
Program for Prosperity and Fairness (PPF) agreements defined ‘enterprise 
partnership’ as an active relationship between stakeholders based on a 
recognition of their common interest in the prosperity of the enterprise, which 
involves common ownership of the resolution of challenges. Nine areas were 
identified in which the concept would be particularly apposite (e.g., work 
organisation, financial involvement; see paragraph 9.12 of Partnership 2000).  
 
Unlike the statutory works council model, the national agreements have used 
a voluntary framework approach (Geary and Roche, 2005) to encourage and 
promote the ‘bottom-up’ development of partnership at local level and allow 
partnership to be tailored to local needs and preferences. The discourse of 
workplace partnership, therefore, is framed in terms of solidarity, 
inclusiveness, participation and workplace democracy. This is particularly true 
of the focus of this article, local government. For example, the Deepening 
Partnership in Local Government Strategic Plan 2003-2005 states that: 
 
‘the vision for partnership in local authorities is for it to become the 
established way of doing business, which would involve management, 
unions and staff at all levels in addressing a wide range of issues of 
strategic and operational importance and in delivering positive 
outcomes to all stakeholders…’ (paragraph 4.1). 
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Irish social partnership thus created a two-tier industrial relations framework 
that operates at national and workplace levels. However, whereas corporatist 
arrangements traditionally established a national framework of entitlements 
and obligations to guide how employers and employees should behave at 
work, social partnership in the Irish case did not display such interlocking 
connections between the two levels. Apart from the centrally agreed obligation 
to pay moderate wage increases, Irish social pacts placed few constraints on 
private sector firms granting them almost ‘complete autonomy to pursue 
corporate strategies of their choosing at the company level’ (Teague and 
Donaghey 2009; 67). Accordingly, whenever scholars referred to partnership 
arrangements at workplace level, they referred to Anglo-Saxon voluntarist 
frameworks rather than the corporatist and statutory settings that govern 
workplace relations in continental Europe (Geary 2008; Roche 2007).  
 
The situation in the public sector, however, has been somewhat more 
complicated. While the national framework agreements were not binding, they 
undoubtedly had more ‘teeth’ as they explicitly required the parties to fuse the 
management of public service reform with the establishment of workplace 
partnership arrangements (Geary, 2008; 563). The aspiration to shift to a 
partnership approach in the public sector comes at a time when public 
administration (particularly, but not exclusively, in the Anglo-Saxon context) 
continues to be subject to what Du Gay (2008: 336) refers to as ‘extraordinary 
degrees of turbulence’. There has been mounting pressure for the public 
sector to be more ‘efficient’ and ‘cost-effective’, which has often resulted in 
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heightened managerialism and the blurring of boundaries between the 
experience of public and private businesses (Pate et al., 2007). 
 
According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), Ireland has ‘significantly advanced along a New Public Management 
(NPM) continuum’ (OECD, 2008: 18) of public sector reform first outlined in 
the Strategic Management Initiative (SMI) of 1994 and expanded through 
Delivering Better Government in 1996 (a specific framework for reform of local 
authority structures, Better Local Government, was also published in 1996). 
The SMI explicitly brought the social partners on board to input into the reform 
process (OECD, 2008). In Ireland, as in most European countries, public 
sector reform efforts have been centred around the need to revamp 
performance appraisal systems and create more effective tools for 
‘performance management’, based on objective setting, feedback and 
performance-linked rewards (Roche, 1999). As a result, all national 
agreements since 1996 have made the payment of agreed salary increases 
for public employees dependent upon co-operation with satisfactory 
implementation of the modernisation agenda set out in the agreements (see, 
for example, paragraph 27.18 of Towards 2016). Performance Verification 
Groups (PVGs) for different sectors (health, local government, etc) were 
established to make recommendations as to whether or not pay increases 
should be made. In all cases, it was envisaged that the process of reform and  
the successful implementation of the change and innovation outlined in the 
national agreements would be accompanied  by ‘robust workplace 
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partnership’ structures ‘characterised by high levels of employee and union 
involvement with management’ (NCPP, 2005: 30). 
 
Thus, we can see a clear interlinking of public policy agendas. The process of 
public sector reform is outlined in strategic documents prepared in 
consultation with the social partners and in the national partnership 
agreements themselves. A framework for workplace partnership structures is 
also outlined in the national agreements. These are to be established with a 
view to the implementation and management of reform and change at 
workplace level in accordance with the principles underlying social 
partnership; solidarity, inclusiveness, participation and workplace democracy. 
 
Despite the promotion of workplace partnership, evidence suggests its 
penetration appears relatively limited (O’ Connell et al., 2004; Geary, 2006). 
Some authors have suggested that a key problem is that of ‘buy-in’ by 
relevant stakeholders (Teague, 2004). Managers may fear that sharing 
information will undermine their authority, while trade union representatives 
may struggle to move away from traditional confrontational behaviour. Others 
suggest that a key problem is that partnership initiatives are often ‘imposed’ 
on workers by management and unions and do not connect with salient 
employee concerns (Tailby et al., 2004).  
 
However, it might be expected that, as the workplace partnership process is 
framed in a discourse of inclusion and participation, public sector staff would 
identify more strongly and positively with partnership (where it exists) at 
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workplace level rather than the more distant, high-level arena of national level 
social partnership. This research investigated the views of stakeholders (and, 
in particular, ordinary employees) in a typical public service workplace, a local 
authority, on both national and workplace level partnership.  
 
Complexity Now: Local Government Reform 
A local authority workplace (Urban City Council2) was chosen as a means of 
looking in more depth at employee views of public sector partnership for a 
number of reasons. First, employees there were all members of the biggest 
public service trade union (IMPACT), which has been an enthusiastic 
supporter of, and has had a key role in, the partnership process. Secondly, 
the council has the same workplace partnership structures that exist in other 
parts of the public sector (the universities, for example). Thirdly, the council 
was, and continues to be, subject to the public service modernisation agenda 
and, indeed, the local government sector has been lauded as a ‘trail-blazer’ in 
respect of elements of this agenda (e.g. independent monitoring and 
verification of performance reporting).3 Furthermore, and crucially for the 
analysis here, local government has been identified as a sector ‘where there 
has been a strong emphasis on deepening social partnership for 
implementing change’ (OECD, 2008: 116). Lastly, the council should present 
a relatively benign environment for partnership structures to be established 
as, for reasons outlined below, we hypothesised that the employees in 
question would be likely to be well-disposed to the concept of workplace 
                                               
2
 Guarantees of anonymity were given, so all names used are pseudonyms.  
3
 See the Service Indicators in Local Authorities 2004 Report available at 
http://www.lgmsb.ie/upload/documents/ServiceIndicators2004.pdf. 
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partnership. Before going on to describe the case study workplace in detail, it 
is necessary to look more closely at reform in the local government sector in 
the light of the general discussion of public sector reform above. 
 
The Local Authority National Partnership Advisory Group (LANPAG) was set 
up as the national partnership body that represents the local authority 
employers and trade unions. It is made up of a number of nominees of the 
employer body, the Local Government Management Services Board 
(LGMSB), and the trade unions. In 1999, LANPAG agreed a framework 
document for partnership within local authorities. Since then its role has been 
to co-ordinate, advise and support each local authority in devising its 
partnership approach, and to promote a two-way flow of communication on 
partnership findings and developments. LANPAG also administers funding for 
the employment of workplace partnership facilitators, provision of training and 
facilitation of meetings. Performance indicators for the local authority sector, 
set out in the PPF and Sustaining Progress national agreements, were also 
agreed through LANPAG. The establishment of Performance Verification 
Groups (PVGs) is handled at national level by the LGMSB. 
 
In Ireland, a key component of reform is the Performance Management 
Development Systems (PMDS) for local authorities agreed by the social 
partners under the Sustaining Progress agreement. Section 26 of Sustaining 
Progress4 sets out a mechanism for verifying performance involving LANPAG, 
the LGPVG (Local Government Performance Verification Group), the 
                                               
4
 See also section 33 of Towards 2016. 
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Secretary-General of the Department of Environment, Heritage and Local 
Government, and the Local Authority National Council.  
 
This is a wondrously complicated process. Initially, an action plan is agreed by 
LANPAG. The action plan is then approved by the LGPVG and issued to each 
local authority by LANPAG. Each Local Authority head then provides a report 
on the progress achieved in respect of the various commitments. This report 
includes any ‘observations’ made by the local partnership committee. When 
the individual local authority reports are received by LANPAG, these reports, 
and a sectoral report, are submitted to the Secretary-General of the 
Department. Having considered these reports, the Secretary-General will 
submit his own assessment of progress to the LGPVG. The LGPVG will then 
carry out its verification process, which includes site visits to individual local 
authorities, and a report, with recommendations, is sent to the Secretary-
General for consideration. At this stage, if the Secretary-General is satisfied 
with progress, s/he will approve payment of the increases due. If not, s/he 
may unilaterally decide to refuse to sanction payments or may defer 
payments.  
 
This process of reform and verification applies in substantially the same 
manner across the entire public service (although, as noted, the local 
government sector is seen as being in the vanguard of the change process). 
To investigate further the links between the reform and partnership processes 
a typical local authority workplace was chosen as a case study location. 
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Investigating Local Authority Partnership 
Urban City Council employs approximately twelve hundred staff in various 
clerical/administrative, professional and manual grades. Around five hundred 
staff members are ‘outdoor’ and they work in various depots around the 
county. The focus here is on the ‘indoor’ staff, predominantly clerical and 
administrative workers, all of whom are members of IMPACT and based in the 
Transportation and Environment departments.  
 
The membership of the indoor local government branch of IMPACT is white-
collar, and industrial action among indoor staff is historically rare. IMPACT is 
seen as a union that frequently resorts to the state dispute resolution 
machinery (the Labour Court, Rights Commissioners etc.). This type of trade 
unionism may be described as being the preserve of better-qualified and more 
professional employees and is based more on upholding the growing array of 
individual workers’ legislative rights, more geared to consultative processes, 
and, arguably, less dependent upon collective action in the traditional sense 
(Wallace et al., 2004). Thus, it might be expected that such workers would be 
more amenable to partnership than those in more ‘militant’ workplaces (or, 
indeed, than their blue-collar, outdoor colleagues).  
 
The research (consisting of semi-structured interviews, documentary analysis, 
and a survey questionnaire) was carried out in 2004 during four day-long 
visits to the council headquarters. Initial interviews took place with the deputy 
head of human resources (HR), the local union representative and the local 
partnership facilitator. Each was asked to suggest employees to be 
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interviewed and each interviewee, in turn, was asked to nominate another 
candidate (‘snowballing’). All employees were interviewed at the workplace. In 
all, interviews with ten staff members (seven females and three males) lasting 
approximately forty-five minutes each were conducted, recorded and 
transcribed. In addition, one hundred survey questionnaires were randomly 
distributed in the two departments and thirty-two responses were received.  
 
The sample, therefore, is small and, as with any case study research, there 
are distinctive circumstances that apply to this workplace so that questions 
about the lack of generalisability do arise (Black et al., 1997). However, the 
detailed examination of processes in an organisational context and knowledge 
about the processes underlying the behaviour and its context can help to 
specify the conditions under which the behaviour can be expected to occur. 
The basis of any generalisation, therefore, is not primarily about the typicality 
of the organisation (notwithstanding the factors typical of the sector-IMPACT’s 
presence, employee profile, archetypical partnership structures and an 
advanced reform agenda-outlined above), but the existence of particular 
processes, which may influence behaviours and actions in organisations 
(Hartley, 2004). 
 
The partnership facilitator, based in the council since 2000, outlined at length 
the setting up and operation of the partnership process there. The initial step 
(four years prior to the research) was to set up a partnership committee with 
representatives of unions and management, chaired by the facilitator. Training 
was brought in for the committee, funded by LANPAG, and based around 
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consensus and problem-solving techniques. One of the initial aspects of the 
process was a series of partnership briefing sessions (a ‘Workplace Review’), 
which all staff members were invited to attend. Employees were broken into 
small groups, mixed with regard to department and grade, and asked to raise 
issues with which they felt partnership should deal. These were collated and a 
database formed. The partnership committee then began to attempt to 
address the issues raised through the establishment of various sub-
committees. As noted above, the committee also has a role in the 
implementation of the reform agenda and verification processes. 
 
Partnership: The View from Below 
Employee respondents were strongly of the view that general social and 
economic conditions, and pay and conditions for workers in the Irish economy 
and in the council itself had improved as a result of the national partnership 
agreements (table 1). One female employee pointed out that her primary 
rationale for union membership was: ‘the pay agreements coming into force at 
the moment. We’re voting yes, yes, yes!’. The interview data generally 
revealed strong support for the process, especially in terms of pay outcomes: 
‘I would absolutely be in favour of partnership.  How could you not be?’ (Cian). 
 
Survey respondents were also asked to consider if trade unions had a greater 
role in influencing state social and economic policy. Two-fifths of respondents 
(thirteen) felt that this was the case while just one responded negatively.5  
                                               
5
 It should be noted that more than half of respondents (eighteen) were undecided. 
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24 4 4 32 
Pay/conditions 
for Irish workers 
27 4 1 32 
Pay/conditions at 
my workplace 
24 5 3 32 
n=32 
 
Broadly speaking, the results suggest a quite positive view of national 
partnership. When the focus shifts to the level of the workplace, however, the 
picture is somewhat different (table 2). Respondents were asked for their 
views on whether greater cooperation between employees and employers at 
the workplace was evident in the partnership era. A large number was 
undecided on this question, while opinion was evenly split among the 
remainder. More worrying from a trade union perspective, is the fact that 
employees clearly feel that unions have not gained more influence at 
workplace level.  
 
The interview data revealed that while respondents believed that workplace 
partnership in principle was a good idea, and that the Workplace Review had 
been a worthwhile exercise, in practice the process had little positive impact 
on their working lives: 
 
‘There would be an awareness that there are partnership groups and 
that. We’ve gone to various workshops about it, we’ve done 
questionnaires about how happy we are in the workplace and do we 
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need change and our colleagues and things like that…I can’t say there 
has been any difference though’ (Deirdre). 
 








co-operation at the 
council 




at the council 
5 11 16 32 
n=32 
 
Overall the interview and survey data indicate a greater approval of national 
partnership. This was unequivocally the view of Brendan, the local union 
representative: 
 
‘(Partnership) at a macro-level where (IMPACT’s General Secretary) 
talks to (the Minister) and his mandarins works very well. I can picture 
them all having a grand chat about pensions and all that stuff, 
important stuff really and it works. But there is no real partnership once 
you get outside of the macro deals’. 
 
As noted above, this is somewhat counter-intuitive given the discourse of 
workplace partnership. Furthermore, this is so despite the fact that the 
evidence seemed to show that workplace partnership has targeted issues of 
concern to the council’s employees. The key issues exercising staff that 
emerged from the fieldwork were the lack of organisational communication, 
problems of communication with management, the lack of performance 
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recognition and feed-back, and issues around promotion and mobility. The 
issues prioritised in the council’s 2003-2005 Strategic Plan closely mirrored 
these; the development of staff fora, the breakdown of barriers between 
grades, improved staff-manager communications and a new system of staff 
recognition/mobility. Moreover, the ‘buy-in’ issue alluded to above did not 
feature to any great degree; according to the partnership facilitator, while 
initially some reservations about the process surfaced on the management 
side in particular, four years on from its inception the management nominees 
were drawn from the upper echelons of the council. Furthermore, the local 
union representative’s objection to the process centred, not on any feeling 
that his (and the local union’s) role was being ‘displaced’ (Geary and Roche, 
2006), but that the partnership process was being invoked by management 
only on a selective basis (see below). 
 
Reform and Rhetoric- Explaining the National-Local 
Divide? 
The small-scale data here reflect national evidence that suggests workplace 
partnership in the public sector is struggling to establish itself and that there is 
a concern about the lack of successful outcomes (Geary, 2006; O’Connell et 
al., 2004; Williams et al., 2004). To explain this we need to take a closer look 
at distributive and structural issues surrounding national and workplace 
partnership. In particular, we believe, a persuasive explanator for the less 
emphatic support for workplace partnership among employees could be its 
use as a vehicle of public sector reform, as evidenced by the rise of 
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managerialist ‘rituals of verification’ in the local government sector (Power, 
1997). 
 
A key element of this relates to the verification process outlined above. We 
saw that, while wage increases are negotiated centrally (and take careful note 
of prevailing macro-economic trends to do with inflation, national 
competitiveness, etc) their delivery is dependent on events and progress at 
local level. This peculiar structure entitles the Secretary-General of a 
government department, upon recommendation of a technocratic verification 
body, to unilaterally suspend the implementation of agreed wage increases 
under the national partnership agreement for a particular local unit, where the 
unit’s progress report fails to meet the performance targets of the public 
sector modernisation action plan. This action plan and progress report system 
effectively turns the local partnership committee into a managerialist body that 
enforces and records local trade union concessions, such as the introduction 
of an individualised PMDS, which are necessary to obtain the wage increases 
under the national agreement.  
 
An extract from the Urban City Council Action Plan/Progress Report from the 
time the fieldwork was carried out is reproduced in Appendix A. The ‘check 
list’ nature of the process may be key to understanding why workplace 
partnership is not viewed in the same positive light as the national process. 
The process certainly differs from traditional productivity and work 
organisation agreements that resulted from collective bargaining. 
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According to the Urban City Council Annual Report the function of PMDS is to 
design and agree a ‘role profile for each employee setting out the key result 
areas and the objectives/standards required’. All employees are to receive a 
‘staff profile’ containing a ‘detailed schedule of staff responsibilities, outlining 
the specific role of staff in each of their key duties’. These roles are to be 
reviewed with staff biannually. Individualised feedback on a one-to-one basis 
for all employees is to be given annually by management. The purpose of the 
appraisal process is to ‘monitor current performance, improve future 
performance, maintain standards, assess potential, develop individuals’ 
training needs and set agreed targets’. The report states that the impact of the 
system to date has been that all staff members ‘are clear of their role and 
responsibilities and what is expected from them’; it also states (without more) 
that ‘productivity has increased since the introduction of the appraisal system’.  
 
Commitment and Control 
A clear majority of respondents in this research (involved in white-collar, semi-
skilled work) reported that their workloads were increasing.6 It was clear that 
respondents felt demands put on them at work were escalating; that work was 
becoming more qualitatively intense: 
 
‘I suppose that’s one of the difficulties of the job. There seem to be 
more things coming onto our table now that weren’t there twenty years 
ago’ (Francis). 
                                               
6
 More than half of survey respondents reported, first, that their workload had increased in the 
last two years and, secondly, that staffing levels in the council were insufficient.  
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A key element of reform under the partnership process has been increased 
interaction with the public and improved service delivery through, inter alia, 
more flexible working patterns (e.g. longer opening hours,) and better 
‘communication of performance to customers’.7 Thompson (1993) argues that 
many jobs (particularly involving service provision) have been expanded to 
include a greater range of tasks, what he refers to as multi-skilling or multi-
tasking. Jobs that involve dealing with the public often require greater levels of 
‘emotion work’ (Noon and Blyton, 2002) and, so, require more ‘bits’ of the 
individual employee to be put into the work. Du Gay (2008) argues it is difficult 
to underestimate the importance allocated to qualities of ‘enthusiasm’, 
‘enterprise’ and ‘compassion’ in recent discourses of public sector 
organisational reform. This ties in with the idea that the search for ‘quality’ 
service provision is likely to require high levels of employee commitment. This 
may result in greater autonomy for, and an upskilling of, workers. The need 
for employers to generate commitment to the organisation, on this view, 
should imply a ‘much firmer basis than in the past for a mutuality of interests 
between labour and management’ (Kelly, 1998: 144), less conflict and, 
therefore, greater scope for consensual employment relations. This will 
arguably be reinforced where employees feel they have a voice regarding key 
issues in their working and organisational life (changes in work practices, 
organisational strategy etc). This, of course, is the discourse that surrounds 
workplace partnership.   
 
                                               
7
 Extracted from the Urban City Council Agreed Action Plan/Progress Report. See also 
Appendix A and section 28 of Towards 2016 
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Respondents here, however, gave extremely negative responses to survey 
questions around information provision and responsiveness to employee 
needs by the employer; a clear majority of council employees felt that the 
organisation was not communicating with, nor responding to, its staff 
effectively (table 3). This finding is strongly reflected by recent national survey 
data. O’ Connell et al. point out that surprisingly high percentages of public 
sector employees seemed to feel that they were ‘hardly ever’ provided with 
information in key areas such as product/service innovation, introduction of 
new technology, re-organisation of services, or changes to work practices  
(2004: 16). 
 






My employer is 
responsive to my 
needs 
10 8 14 32 
I am kept well 




8 5 19 32 
n=32 
 
It is clear that all employers need to garner some minimum level of 
commitment from their employees to the organisation or, at least, to the task 
in hand. Much of the literature on contemporary service sector employment 
emphasises the need for organisations to ‘differentiate’ themselves on the 
basis of ‘quality service’ and ‘customer care’ (Bosch and Lehndorff, 2005). 
Even for the most protected sectors of public service employment 
‘consumerist’ principles and expectations are increasingly relevant to how 
services are provided (Crouch, 1999). Thus, arguably, the need to generate 
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employee commitment grows ever more acute in such sectors. At the same 
time, the nature of the business influences how this is achieved. It might be 
likely that commitment can be generated through individualised pay structures 
or by granting employees greater ‘responsible autonomy’ in their work (Noon 
and Blyton, 2002). However, there is a less benign view of the manner in 
which employees become more ‘embedded’ in the organisation. This view 
highlights that where neo-Taylorist models of work organisation have been 
introduced, flatter organisational structures and relative employee autonomy 
exist side-by side with increased delegation of responsibility to employees to 
meet market-determined economic objectives of the employer; this leads to 
the emergence of ‘(organisation) dependent independent employees’  (Dølvik 
and Waddington, 2005: 323).  Here, employee compliance and direct 
management control are more likely to feature. 
 
This latter view seems to approximate the ‘metrics’ approach adopted in the 
local authority sector. New Public Management research has suggested that 
performance indicators tend to have an inability to explain why and how 
certain things happened; they can also result in an excessive focus on what 
gets measured (and, frequently, this tends to be extremely short-term action). 
As it is extremely difficult to design a performance measurement model, which 
adequately captures all aspects of multi-faceted work of the types increasingly 
being done by local authority employees, the introduction of quantitative 
performance metrics is likely, not to induce greater effort on the part of 
employees, but rather ‘influence their distribution of effort, and of time and 
attention, among their different responsibilities’ (Goldthorpe, 2000: 218). The 
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introduction of controlling benchmarking techniques, then, represents a 
fundamental shift from the ‘management by commitment’ suggested by the 
discourse of workplace partnership to the neo-Taylorist ‘management by 
control’ approach traditionally used in relation to unskilled employees, like 
assembly-line workers. Apparently, in return for the pay increases negotiated 
at national level, local government employees at the workplace are required to 
work through a (Fordist-like?) list of conditions to be fulfilled in terms of 
performance measurement. This suggests the possibility that what is 
happening on the ground in local authorities is more micro-management 
despite a more multi-faceted workload, and more quantitative targets to be 
reached despite the qualitative language of ‘service’, ‘quality’, and ‘inclusion’.  
Thus, we see the expected relationship between more multi-faceted work and 
management style inverted; the greater the range of tasks and skills required 
of local government employees (including more ‘emotion’ work) the more 
‘management by control’. This interpretation of events at Urban City Council 
finds support in the OECD review of the Irish public sector generally: 
 
‘The Performance Verification Process is, for example, a monitoring 
mechanism of co-operation, in an industrial relations context, with 
modernisation processes under the pay agreements, rather than a 
forum for a holistic review of organisational performance’ (2008: 29, 
emphasis added). 
 
This is likely to have important implications for the ‘public sector ethos’, which 
may be undermined by such a metrics-based approach (Wickham, 2006). 
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Recent national data found that while four-fifths of respondents professed 
themselves ‘proud to work for (their) organisation’, it was public sector 
workers who were more likely to respond positively (O’ Connell et al., 2004: 
30). Although council workers may not be felt to embody such an ethos to the 
extent of, say, nurses or teachers, there was evidence from the respondents 
that work in local government was seen as having a positive association with 
public service. One interview respondent, for example, referred to the 
satisfaction of being able to contribute to solving issues of local public 
concern:  
 
‘I always had a great interest in traffic safety generally. (In 1994) I 
became the county road safety officer here. I really, really enjoy what 
I’m doing…I think (that is) worth an awful lot of extra money if you can 
out a monetary value on it (Francis). 
 
As Wickham (2006) points out, public sector organisations are part of the 
common public sphere and exist to service citizens, not customers. Thus, 
NPM ‘accounting techniques’ by: 
 
‘measuring all elements of performance in order to identify the specific 
public service elements (so that the state can then explicitly pay for 
them) undermines the general public service ethos of the enterprise’ 
(ibid: 166).  
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Similarly, Pate et al. (2007) find the most persuasive explanation of the 
decline of trust in public sector management that they document to be the 
erosion of the public sector ethos and ‘the denigration of public sector 
ideology and values’ (ibid: 466) represented by senior management 
commitment to a resource-based view of public sector organisations.  
 
National Gain for Local Pain? 
How does this relate to the positive attitudes displayed towards national 
partnership? Too often in the literature, partnership at national and local level 
is viewed separately. There is, in relation to public sector partnership, 
however, a need to explicitly integrate views of both as part of the same 
system. In this research, virtually all respondents (employees, union 
representatives and employers) agreed on the success of the partnership 
process in terms of pay outcomes. Representation in pay negotiations, 
obviously, remains one of the key determinants of trade union membership. 
National partnership, therefore, gives the union movement a very visible and 
easily identifiable return; periodic wage increases. Conversely, the absence of 
any local bargaining renders the impact of the local union less discernable.8 
 
National social partnership may also be seen to be more acceptable or 
appealing to stakeholders (including employees) because it at least aspires to 
fulfil ideas of deliberative democracy. Labour is explicitly, and, crucially, 
publicly, given a ‘voice’, and is viewed as having political and policy-making 
                                               
8
 This is less of a factor in the public, as opposed to private, sector given the centralised 
nature of pay determination. Nevertheless, local ‘top up’ bargaining did occur in the pre-
partnership era. 
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‘clout’. This can be seen in the manner in which the contents of the national 
agreements have been progressively expanded, from an early focus simply 
on the questions of pay and tax reform, to the plethora of issues that now 
feature (migration, waste management, alcohol/drug misuse, etc.). Under the 
various partnership agreements, a host of bodies, working groups, and task 
forces, on which the unions are represented, have been set up (twenty-three 
under the PPF alone; Turner, 2002) and through the involvement in the 
process of community and voluntary groups, union representatives have 
come into contact with a range of other civil society actors. The sense of 
partnership giving the unions a policy platform beyond the narrow confines of 
workplace bargaining was alluded to by Brendan (IMPACT workplace 
representative): 
 
‘Being promised long-term macroeconomic taxation policy stuff was a 
new dimension, and in ‘87 and the early ‘90s you had to say, “we’re 
going to have to wait for these tax cuts”, and you did have to wait but 
you did get them. People on both sides did honour their word’. 
 
At workplace level, however, the picture is quite different. Here, respondents 
did not endorse the view that partnership resulted in more ‘voice’ (particularly 
in terms of union voice) and, as explained above, micro-management and 
quantitative target-setting were increasing. As can be seen from the extract of 
the Action Plan/Progress Report in Appendix A, many of the key commitments 
agreed in exchange for pay increases remain to be decided at national level 
(atypical working arrangements, for example) with merely their 
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implementation left to local actors. The extent to which local implementation 
occurs through partnership is, it seems, variable. Thus, the pay increases 
negotiated nationally come with attached conditionalities to be worked through 
at local level, many of which, it seems, are implemented by management 
‘decree’. One example given by Brendan colourfully bears this out: 
 
‘The manager, for example, decided he wanted a paper-free, 
automated environment and he just decreed that, you know... if 
anybody had any reservations or objections or suggestions, well, 
tough. It was coming in and that was it’. 
 
This interpretation seemed to be confirmed by Alice (HR representative): 
 
‘What has happened with partnership is that management have 
decided on things that they might want to send to the partnership 
committee’ (emphasis added).   
 
This, again, reflects national trends. The ESRI/NCPP study examined both 
the type of information available in the workplace and the extent to which 
workers’ views are considered and acted upon. Approximately a quarter of 
respondents reported that they were ‘rarely’ or ‘almost never’ consulted prior 
to major decisions, provided with feedback on why decisions had been made 
or, even where prior consultation had taken place, had any attention paid to 
their views (O’ Connell et al., 2004: 95). In Urban City Council, respondents 
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were strongly of the view that workplace partnership initiatives (especially the 
Workplace Review) had not resulted in their views being taken into account: 
 
‘We were all asked our views on a whole load of different things, but 
nothing happened. Maybe that’s the problem; nothing ever happens 
from anything. It’s great to talk, it’s great to get everybody’s views, but 
if nothing changes then what’s the point?’ (Mandy). 
 
In relation to one key issue of public sector reform, the introduction of PMDS, 
local partnership did have a role to play in the council. Given that this was 
identified by management, unions and staff at the time of the research as the 
main HR issue coming down the line one might have expected partnership to 
be actively involved in the information and consultation process around the 
introduction of the system. Instead, according to the partnership facilitator: 
 
‘partnership will be involved in promoting (PMDS) and explaining 
what’s within it. I think the greatest fear of it by staff would be they see 
it as a stick coming to beat them. We need to sell it as a means of them 
identifying areas that would allow them to improve themselves within 
their work location, and to improve the public service generally beyond 
that’ (emphasis added).  
 
Thus, the role of local partnership would be to ‘sell’ the (seemingly 
unquestioned) merits of PMDS to staff, rather than actively involving the latter 
in ‘common ownership of the resolution of challenges’ (Partnership 2000), or 
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indeed ‘the customisation of national policies for local level implementation’ 
(LANPAG Strategic Plan 2003-2005). The discourse of inclusion, participation 
and deliberative democracy, it seems, arrives at the level of workplace 
partnership in a highly qualified fashion. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given this, 
the attempts made to ‘sell’ the system had not been successful, and there 
remained significant fear and mistrust amongst staff members: 
 
‘In HR a lot of the policies and procedures are always bent. People 
implement them in their own way. You will never have standard across 
the board and it’s the same with PMDS. If someone doesn’t like their 
employee, it’s obviously going to work out not in the employee’s favour’ 
(Geraldine) 
 
Interestingly, the restricted role for the local partnership committee in relation 
to a key reform mechanism like PMDS seems to be not untypical of the 
broader public service. The NCPP review of Civil Service reform identified a 
number of cases where, while partnership committees had initiated and 
implemented many policy decisions concerning the work environment, they 
simply ‘undertook a monitoring role when dealing with the PMDS issue’ (2003: 
5). 
 
A final problem is the thorny issue of the binding arbitration procedure 
regarding pay compliance clauses introduced as part of Sustaining Progress 
(which contains binding mechanisms to bring finality to pay disputes) and the 
fact that all of the partnership agreements contain ‘no strike’ clauses (see 
appendix A).For staff and the local union industrial action in respect of any of 
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the conditionalities tied to pay agreements (negotiated, remember, centrally) 
is not an option.  
 
Conclusions 
Over the last two decades, social partnership has become institutionalised as 
the ‘normal’ method of socio-economic governance in Ireland. As part of the 
process, issues of public sector pay and modernisation have featured 
increasingly in the national agreements. The sample in this research is small 
and we must be careful about generalising. However the case study location 
was selected as a means of investigating in-depth how the (archetypal) 
workplace partnership process operates in the local authority sector. 
Particularly apposite for this research, given the nature of the workforce 
(white-collar, professional employees who are members of a union noted for 
its reluctance to engage in traditional collective action) and the nature of 
public sector clerical/administrative work, is the fact that we would expect 
these workers to be among the groups most likely to be well-disposed 
towards a non-conflictual, partnership approach. 
 
The findings here echo national data (Roche, 2007) in indicating that most 
respondents in this public sector workplace were quite supportive of national 
level social partnership. However, the data show that there has been a 
singular failure by the union movement to effectively link the different levels of 
partnership. Respondents did not see much evidence of a more ‘partnership 
oriented’ approach to employer-employee relations, or greater employee 
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participation, and did not see any significant increase in union influence at 
their workplace.  
 
The findings suggest that partnership at national level has been seen by most 
respondents as relatively beneficial in terms of pay and the broad economic 
climate. Clearly, too, the process (at least until the economic turbulence of 
2009) has coincided with a period of sustained economic growth. The 
(relative) satisfaction with, and enhancement of, the trade union movement’s 
national standing, however, must be set against the more negative perception 
of partnership at the workplace. It seems that in the Irish partnership process 
the benefits (pay and some level of policy input) accrue at national level, while 
the costs (conditionalities, binding arbitration, etc.) are felt at local level. In this 
article, we have, thus, sought to emphasise the (slightly ambiguous) national 
gains and the (rather more entrenched) local pains of Irish social partnership 
in the public sector. Here, partnership is an odd case, as it is not truly 
voluntarist but nor does it operate on a statutory basis. The voluntary national 
agreements actually set up a ‘quasi-statutory’ mechanism in the public sector 
which is tightly linked to the modernisation agenda. The result is that, in terms 
of modernisation and change, the local union (via workplace partnership 
structures) simply ‘negotiates’ for the least bad result. Local representatives 
are required, for example, to bring forward proposals merely as to type of 
PMDS to be implemented.  
 
The example of this local authority suggests that partnership has resulted in a 
trade off of pay increases for, arguably, less employee and union voice at the 
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workplace, with local partnership committees reduced to the role of ‘selling’ a 
pre-determined reform agenda. The process has been used in a managerialist 
manner to steer through a public sector reform schedule, which seeks tighter, 
more controlling management structures, and which risks undermining the 
core public service ethos. This suggests a version of ‘deliberative democracy’ 
that is largely instrumental; the use of partnership as a legitimisation tool.9  
The union movement, it seems, has singularly failed to adequately link 
structures of national and workplace partnership. The same cannot be said of 
the state and employers, who viewed partnership as a vehicle for market-
based public sector reform. However, in early 2009, employers, both public 
and private, decided to freeze all pay rises due under the national social 
partnership agreement (Sheehan 2009). This move not only sheds a new light 
on Teague and Donaghey’s (2009) account of Irish partnership as an 
‘unorthodox system of institutional complementarities’, but also questions its 
future practical use for state officials as a tool to manufacture consent for 
market-based public sector reform.   
 
                                               
9
 See Bacon and Samuel (2009: 245) for a similar discussion in the UK context. 
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Appendix A: Edited Extract from Urban County Council Agreed Action 
Plan/Progress Report 200310 
No. Commitment Specific Action(s) Date of 
completion 
Progress achieved 




customer service will be 
a particular focus of the 
partnership structures 
going forward. 
Performance will be 
evaluated against these 
standards and the 
results published in 
annual reports or 
another appropriate 
format.   
 Service indicators already in 
place and performance 
reported in Annual Reports 
since 2000. This initiative is 
currently being examined 
with a view to 
improving/expanding current 
indicators (21 in all) and 
better communication of 
performance to customers 
and stakeholders 
 
 Customer Action Plan (CAP) 
to be implemented in 
conjunction with Corporate 
Plan in consultation with 
partnership committees. 
Intention is to determine 
best practice in the tools for 
service improvement and 
introduce these in 























 Customer service 





















relations environment to 
minimise disputes 
affecting the level of 
service to the public. A 
stable IR climate has 
benefits for improved 
productivity and staff 
morale, increased 
public confidence and 
the maintenance of 
Ireland as a desirable 
location for foreign 
direct investment 
  
 No cost increasing claims 
for improvements in pay or 
conditions of employment 
will be made or processed 
during the course of the 
Agreement; 
 The agreement precludes 
strikes or other forms of 
industrial action on any 
matter covered by the 
Agreement. 
 Ongoing  A stable IR 
climate exists with 
no disputes 
                                               
10
 The extract is edited in order to protect the anonymity of the local authority in question. 
Some further minor edits were made in the interests of brevity. 
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Modernisation and Flexibility  
8 
[20.6] 
The parties are 
committed to increased 
flexibility to ensure that 
public services are 
delivered in a manner, 
which more closely 
reflects the needs of its 
customers.   
 All staff will engage fully with 
the ongoing process of 
transforming to a knowledge 
organisation.  
 Central elements include 
capturing and sharing of 
knowledge, business 
process improvements, 











It is accepted that the 
use of new technology 
may necessitate 
significant change in 
work processes in order 
that the benefits of 
technology will be 
maximised.  There will 
be full co-operation with 
the design and 
implementation of 
eGovernment projects. 
 Full co-operation with the  
voicemail policy, e-calendar 
policy and all ICT policies 
including internet: 
 Full co-operation with 
Clockwise for staff and 
supervisors on the system: 
 Full co-operation with 
Agresso, FOI and other 
projects: 
 
 Ongoing  
Atypical Working Arrangements  
11 
[21.8] 
The work pattern may 
be such in specific 
areas that specific work 
processes can be 
performed most 
effectively by part time 
staff. 
 A sub-committee is currently 
issuing recommendations 
on foot of the introduction of 
the Part-Time Workers 
legislation, having regard to 
custom and practice within 
LAs, equality legislation, HR 
and industrial relations best 
practice, and natural justice 
 Opportunities for part time 
work will be monitored over 
the course of this agreement 
 July 03  This matter is 
being dealt with at 
national level by 
the LGMSB 
 Opportunities are 
being monitored 
Attendance Patterns  
13 
[21.10] 
In order to provide a 
satisfactory level of 
service to the public, 
there is a need in 
certain areas for 
changes to the standard 
working day in order to 
provide services outside 
the traditional “9 to 5” 
pattern.   
 The introduction of flexible 
work patterns will be 
activated through the 
partnership process 
 Lunchtime opening of 
offices and switchboard 
 Late night/weekend opening 
of offices as required 
 Abolition of work crews 






 May 04 
 
 Jan 04 
 
 June 04 
 
 
 
